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Case No. 920255 
910071-CA 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court and the court of appeals properly 
hold that "the totality of the circumstances•' test applies to the 
question of whether a confession was voluntarily given, and 
correctly rule that Petitioner's confession was admissible 
against him under that test? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
AND 
ASSERTED GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
The court of appeals opinion, State v, Miller, appears 
at 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 40, copied in the Appendix to this brief; 
the decision was entered on March 24, 1992. The State stipulated 
to a thirty-day extension of time in which to file the petition 
for certiorari, which was filed May 28, 1992. 
Petitioner argues that the court of appeals decision in 
the case at bar is in conflict with another decision of the court 
of appeals, permitting certiorari review under Rule 46(a), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State accepts the statement of the case and the 
fact statement set forth in the court of appeals opinion, 183 
Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1992). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
PETITIONER HAS NOT SHOWN A CONFLICT BETWEEN 
DECISIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. 
Petitioner has not shown good reason to review the 
court of appeals decision here. "Review by a writ of certiorari 
is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will be 
granted only for special and important reasons." Utah R. App. P. 
46. Contrary to his argument for certiorari, petitioner fails to 
show that this case conflicts with another decision of the court 
of appeals. See Utah R. App. P. 46 (b). 
Affirming the admissiblity of petitioner's confession, 
the court of appeals followed this Court's holding in State v. 
Strain, 779 P.2d 221 (Utah 1989), that "the determination of 
voluntariness of confessions requires the court to consider 'the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the 
characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
interrogation.'" JLd. at 225 (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218f 226 (1973)). Petitioner claims that the court of 
appeals decision in State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303 (Utah App. 
1991), conflicts with the court of appeals decision here, 
claiming that the Singer panel did not consider the defendant's 
"peculiar characteristics" in judging whether that confession was 
2 
voluntary. Therefore, he argues, the courts here should not have 
considered his personal characteristics when determining that his 
confession was voluntary. 
In order for a confession to be involuntary, there must 
be "police overreaching," or coercive misconduct. See Colorado 
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986). In Singer, there was no 
police misconduct. In fact, defendant Singer admitted that his 
conversation with police was not inherently coercive; instead, he 
argued that his statements were involuntary due to his peculiar 
characteristics. Singer, 815 P.2d at 1309. Singer claimed that 
he was susceptible to "subtle coercion" when the officers spoke 
of their desire to return home after a long seige. However, the 
court rejected Singer's claim that the officers' remarks were 
equivalent to interrogation, holding that they were nothing more 
than "the natural expression of familial sentiment", and not an 
attempt to manipulate the defendant into talking. Singer, 815 
P.2d at 1312. 
Accordingly, while there was some degree of coercion in 
this case—i.e., questioning in jail, mention of federal charges, 
183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41—none was present in Singer. 
Defendant's statements in Singer "were not the product of 
coercive tactics . . . [but] were voluntarily made." Singer, 815 
P.2d at 1311. Thus, the defendant's alleged peculiarities in 
Singer were irrelevant because there was no police coercion. 
Because this case did involve some coercive police 
conduct, it became necessary to examine petitioner's personal 
3 
characteristics. The trial court and the court of appeals ruled 
that those characteristics—intelligence, articulateness, 
experience with the criminal system, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. at 41— 
protected petitioner's will from being overborne by that police 
conduct. Therefore, both courts concluded that his confession 
was voluntary. 
Petitioner misreads the court's evaluation of the 
accused's characteristics in Singer. Singer provided expert 
testimony to support his claim that he "was uniquely susceptible 
to subtle coercion and . . . extremely gullible." Singer, 815 
P.2d at 1310. However, much of this testimony was "effectively 
discredited by the State's own expert." Ld. Thus, although the 
absence of police coercion made it unnecessary to consider 
Singer's personal characteristics in determining whether his 
statements had been voluntary, the court did so, and actually 
rejected his "gullibility" claim on its merits. 
In sum, Singer does not conflict with Petitioner's 
case. Because defendant Singer had not been subjected to any 
coercive police conduct, no detailed examination of his personal 
characteristics was needed. Here, examination of Petitioner's 
personal characteristics under this Court's guiding precedent in 
Strain supported the trial court and the court of appeals in 
their conclusion that, despite some coercive police conduct, 
petitioner's confession was voluntary. 
4 
POINT II 
PETITIONER DID NOT PROPERLY PRESERVE HIS 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE FOR APPEAL IN THE 
TRIAL COURT. 
Petitioner claims that his state constitutional issue 
was properly preserved in the trial court by merely having a cite 
to State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178 (Utah 1943)f a case containing 
some state constitutional analysis, in his motion to suppress. 
Petitioner also cites State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 
1987), asserting that "[a] proper objection need not cite a case; 
it need only fairly apprise the trial judge of the essence of the 
objection." Id. at 1076. However, in this case, the trial judge 
never was "apprised" of petitioner's state constitutional 
argument, since it was not argued before the judge. 
Furthermore, Crank itself does not even advocate a 
different analysis between the state and federal constitutions. 
Crank quotes from Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 
183 (1897), in reaching its determination. See, e.g., Crank, 142 
P.2d at 188-89. Consequently, since Crank relied on Bram in its 
conclusions, it was implicitly rejected in Strain, when this 
Court noted and endorsed the rejection of Bram's "rigid rule" 
that "any threat or promise, however slight, renders a confession 
involuntary and inadmissible . . .•" 779 P.2d at 227. 
Therefore, the court of appeals correctly held here 
that petitioner's state constitutional issue was not properly 
preserved because it "was not argued before the trial court, nor 
brought to the court's attention for consideration." 183 Utah 
5 
Adv. Rep. at 42 (1992). Petitioner should not be allowed to make 
an end-run around the rule that, absent exceptional 
circumstances, an issue "not presented to the trial court . . . 
has not been properly preserved for appeal", State v. Anderson, 
789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990), by merely citing a questionable case 
in a motion to suppress, without analysis. 
POINT III 
THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST IS THE 
PROPER TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A CONFESSION 
IS VOLUNTARY. 
The State believes that a detailed response to 
petitioner's argument for a "Rram-like" approach to confessions 
is not necessary at this point. He did not adequately preserve 
his argument for such an approach in the trial court. This Court 
rejected that approach in Strain, which was followed here. Nor 
has this Court expressed any dissatisfaction with the federally-
originated "totality of the circumstances" approach. Compare 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 466-69 (Utah 1990) (plurality 
opinion) (decrying federal law of automobile searches as a 
contradictory "labyrinth," and espousing new approach under Utah 
Constitution). Accordingly, his argument for a departure from 
the federal model can be dismissed with minimal consideration. 
6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for Writ of 
Certiorari should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j5~2r-day of July, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
i • ^yw,i 
J. KEVIN MURPHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari were mailed, postage prepaid, to RONALD S. FUJINO and 
CHARLES F. LOYD, JR., attorneys for defendant/petitioner, 424 
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GARFF, Judge: 
Mikel Shane Miller appeals his conviction of 
third degree burglary and third degree theft, 
claiming the trial judge improperly admitted 
into evidence a coerced and involuntary con-
fession. We affirm. 
FACTS 
Miller was booked into the Salt Lake 
County Jail on July 2 or 3, 1990, following a 
parole violation unrelated to the charges inv-
olved in this appeal. On July 6, 1990, a dete-
ctive interrogated Miller about his possible 
involvement in a burglary and theft of a 
computer store. 
Prior to the interrogation, the detective 
informed Miller of the potential charges facing 
him and read Miller his Miranda rights. The 
detective promised Miller that he would make 
the best recommendation possible to the pro-
secutor and would attempt to 'get [the 
charges] filed as kr* as he possibly could" if 
Miller cooperated. Xkt detective also informed 
Miller that he potentially faced federal charges 
and resulting penalties. Miller then confessed 
to the crimes and was released from jail into 
the custody of the detective in order to help 
recover the stolen goods. 
Miller cooperated extensively with the det-
ective in recovering the stolen goods. He also 
cooperated with other officers in a later, suc-
cessful sting operation. Felony charges were, 
however, eventually filed against Miller. 
At trial, the State sought admission of the 
confettfon. Miller objected, claiming the det-
ective had not met his part of the bargain in 
getting the charges reduced to misdemeanors. 
Miller argued that promises of leniency and 
threau of federal charges coercively induced 
his confession. 
The court applied a 'totality of circumsta-
nces' test in deciding whether to admit the 
testimony. It found the length of time Miller 
had vent in Jail prior to the interrogation and 
the threau of possible federal charges were 
'impermissibly coercive.* However, the court, 
noting Miller's familiarity with the justice 
system and various interrogation techniques, 
also found him to be intelligent, well-spoken 
and articulate. Thus, based on the totality of 
the circumstances, the court declared Miller's 
confession voluntary and denied his motion to 
suppress. 
aurora 
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Following a bench trial, Miller was convi-
cted of two third degree felonies, burglary and 
theft. The trial judge commented that without 
Miller's confession, he could not have found 
Miller guilty on the theft charge. 
Miller appeals, claiming the confession was 
improperly admitted into evidence because it 
was obtained through promises of leniency 
and threats of federal prosecution in a coer-
cive environment. Miller also claims that the 
Fifth Amendment of the Utah Constitution 
provides broader protection against self incr-
imination than does the totality of the circu-
mstances test of the federal constitution. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The 'ultimate issue of 'voluntariness' (of a 
confession] is a legal question/ Arizona v. 
Fulminante, _ U . S _ 111 S. Q 1246, 1252 
(1991) (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104,110,106 S. Q. 445,449-50 (1985)); accord, 
State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1309 
(Utah App. 1991), which we review indepen-
dently giving no deference to the trial court. 
Suite v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 
1991). 'It is the duty of an appellate court ... 
'to examine the entire record ard make an 
independent determination of the ultimate 
issue of voluntariness." State v. Bishop, 753 
P.2d 439, 464 n.76 (Ufeh 1W) (quoting 
Beckwith v. United States, 425 US. 341, 348, 
96 S. Q. 1612,1617(1976)). 
TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
Miller claims promises of leniency and 
threats of federal prosecution in a coercive 
environment induced his involuntary confes-
sion. 
Miller's claim is based largely on the trial 
court's determination that the threat of 
federal charges, the promises of leniency and 
the length of his stay in jail prior to the inte-
rrogation were evidence of 'impermissible" I 
coercion.1 Certainly, there are cases which I 
support such a conclusion. Threats of possibly 1 
greater charges were found to be coercive in 
State v. Rhiner, 352 N.W.2d 258, 262-64 
(Iowa 1984) (defendant coercively tol4 'he 
might be in Jeopardy on other charges unless 
he cooperated"). Promises of leniency have 
also been found to be a coercive factor. United 
StMtes v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1335 
9th Or. 1981) ("promise to aeek lenient tre- I 
atment" is evidence of coercion). Moreover, I 
confinement in jail provides a suspect letting I 
for coercive interrogations. StMte v. Moore, I 
697 ?JU 233,236 (Utah 1985). 
However, in StMte v. Strain, 779 PJd 221 
(Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court declined 
to follow a strict per ae rule and designated 
the totality of circumstances test as appropr-
iate for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.1 Id. at 227. The court stated, 
*(w)hile is Aram v. United StMtes, 168 U.S. 
532, 18 S. O . 183, 42 L. Ed. 568 (1897), the 
statement was made that any threat or 
promise, however slight, renders a confession 
involuntary and inadmissible, later cases do 
not repeat that rigid rule but follow the tota-
lity of all the circumstances test/ Strain, 779 
P.2d at 227. The court then remanded Strain 
to the trial court to determine the voluntari-
ness of the confession by considering the 
'totality of all the surrounding circumsta-
nces/ Id. Therefore, we continue our analysis 
to determine whether from the totality of the 
circumstances 'the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation" 
support the trial court's conclusion that the 
confession was voluntary. Id. at 225 (quoting 
Schneckioth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
226,93 S. Q. 2041,2047 (1973)). 
The record reveals that defendant is an 
intelligent individual with some college educ-
ation. The trial court noted that Miller "has a 
mind that can make sudden and important 
distinctions in language/ He is also very 
familiar with the legal system. He has been to 
prison twice, jailed four times, and has had 
some fifteen encounters with police. Miller's 
own recollection of the interrogation demon-
strates he was familiar with interrogation tec-
hniques and that he actively and intelligently 
participated in the interrogation: 
I told [the detective] 1 was aware 
where I am at that time frame with 
the system, unfortunately, and that 
I've seen the you scratch my back, 
I'll scratch yours type of play 
before, and I don't want to put my 
neck on the line and go through all 
this for nothing, to incriminate 
myself.... [I]f there is any way 
possible that I can work my way 
out of a felony, I would be more 
than willing to do that. 
In short, the record reveals Miller actively 
participated in the interrogation process, and 
may have actually initiated and sobcited the 
promise to recommend more lenient treatment, 
and that he was fully aware of the possible 
effect of a confession. In addition, the detec-
tive did not unqualifiedly promise Miller he 
would not be charged with a felony, but only 
that be would use his best efforts to have the 
charge reduced. 
The trial judge thus correctly refused to 
suppress Miller's confession under the totality 
of the circumstances test because "the chara-
cteristics of the accused* outweigh any pote-
ntially coercive "details of the interrogation/ 
Id. 
STATE CONSTITUTION 
Miller argues that the Utah Constitution 
provides broader protection against the adm-
ission of involuntary confessions than does the 
federally adopted "totality of the circumsta-
nces" test. We need not reach this issue as it 
UTAH ADVANCE EEPORTS 
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was not presented to the trial court at the 
suppression hearing, and thereby has not been 
properly preserved for appeal. State v. Ande-
rson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). Also, 
Miller has failed to present any exceptional 
circumstances or demonstrate plain error, 
either of which would warrant an exception to 
this rule. See State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 78 
(Utah App. 1990). 
Rather, Miller argues that this issue was 
properly preserved for appeal on the ground 
that he cited the case of State v. Crank, 105 
Utah 332, 142 P.2d 178 (1943) in his Memor-
andum Supporting Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress.* However, the argument that Crank 
may be read to provide broader protections in 
suppression hearings was not argued before 
the trial court, nor brought to the court's 
attention for consideration. We refuse to 
adopt such a broad rule that would preserve 
an issue for appeal by merely citing to a case 
without accompanying argument. Barring 
exceptional circumstances or plain error, a 
party must bring an issue to the attention of 
the trial court to properly preserve it for 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the totality of the circumstances, 
the trial court did not err in concluding that 
the confession was voluntary. Therefore, the 
trial court did not err in refusing to suppress 
Miller's confession. 
Affirmed. 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
1. The trial judge stated: 
There is no doubt in my mind there was 
some indication of leniency given to the 
defendant here.... 
I think that what the officer told Mr. 
Miller in jail was ... "listen, 2 am close 
to the prosecutor. He generally will 
accept my recommendations. If you can 
help us we will see what you can 
produce and I will do the best 1 can to 
get him to file misdemeanor charges." 
I assume (the officer] also told 
(Miller] he was facing federal charges 
and that that was in some way a coer-
cion.... 1 find that he had been in jail 
three or four days, which is a substantial 
time, and that indicates to some extent 
there is some coercion. 
2. The United States Supreme Court likewise rece-
ntly declined to follow a strict per se rule in Arizona 
v. Fulminante, _ J J . S _ 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1252 
0991). 
3. In Crank, the Utah Supreme Court relied on 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution to 
determine whether a confession was admissible, but 
the court did not address the issue of whether state 
v. Rep. 40 fr0*0' U u h 
constitutional protections might be broader than 
federal protections. 
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